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Abstract
A method is given for resolving a matrix of preference scores into
a well-specified mixture of options. This is done in agreement with
several desirable properties, including the continuity of the mixing
proportions with respect to the preference scores and a condition of
compatibility with the Condorcet-Smith majority principle. These
properties are achieved by combining the classical rating method of
Zermelo with a projection procedure introduced in previous papers of
the same authors.
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ing, majority principles, Condorcet-Smith principle, clone consistency,
one-dimensional scaling, Zermelo’s method of strengths, Luce’s choice
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A vote is an expression of the preferences of several individuals about certain
options with a view towards reaching a common decision. Generally speaking,
the decision need not be choosing a single option, but it can also take the form
of mixing a number of them according to certain proportions. For instance,
one could be dividing a prize among several contenders, or a budget among
several items. This article is aimed at a method for suitably determining the
proportions of such mixed collective choices.
The input from which we set ourselves to derive these proportions or
mixing fractions is the matrix of preference scores of Ramon Llull and Con-
dorcet [16 : § 3, § 7], i. e. the matrix that compares each option to every other
in terms of the number of voters who prefer the former to the latter.
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Assume, for instance, that a committee of 18 people must decide how
to distribute a budget among four items a,b,c,d and that they express the
following preferences:
10 : a>b>c>d, 3 : b>c>d>a, 3 : c>d>b>a, 2 : d>b>a>c. (1)
The number in front of each ranking indicates how many people expressed it.
One can work out that a is preferred to b by 10 people against 8, b is preferred
to c by 15 against 3, et cetera. These numbers are collected in the following
table, that we call the Llull matrix of the vote:1
a 10 12 10
8 b 15 13
6 3 c 16
8 5 2 d
. (2)
In which proportions should the budget be divided?
Notice that the individual votes cannot be recovered from the Llull ma-
trix. Therefore, our setting is not suitable for the purpose of proportional
representation, which has to do with mapping the electorate onto the elected
options and therefore requires more information than just the Llull matrix
of the vote. However, our setting still seems appropriate for distributing a
prize or a budget between different options in accordance with their relative
merits as summarized in the Llull matrix.
In the preceding example the preferential information is complete: since
every voter has ordered all the options, the preference scores for any ordered
pair of options and its opposite add up to the total number of voters. Gen-
erally speaking, however, it need not be so. For instance, voters could give
only truncated rankings, where no preferences are expressed between the non-
mentioned options. The method that we are looking for should be able to
deal also with such situations of incomplete preferences. An extreme case is
that where every voter confines to choosing a single option. In this case, the
mixing fractions should certainly coincide with the respective vote fractions.
We will refer to this requirement as single-choice voting consistency.
Assume, for instance, that 100 voters express themselves in the following
way:
54 : a, 22 : b, 13 : c, 11 : d. (3)
1Since we are interested only in the preferences of x over y for x 6= y , we use the
diagonal cells for specifying the simultaneous labelling of rows and columns by the existing
options. The cell located in row x and column y gives information about the preference
of x over y .
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That is, 54 voters express their preference for a over any of the three other
options, but they do not give any information about their preferences between
b,c and d; the other voters act similarly in connection with other options.
One easily checks that the Llull matrix of this vote takes the following form:
a 54 54 54
22 b 22 22
13 13 c 13
11 11 11 d
. (4)
The condition of single-choice voting consistency requires that in such a sit-
uation the mixing fractions shoud be (0.54, 0.22, 0.13, 0.11).
Priority ratings are often used only for ranking purposes. However, in
this article we are interested in mixing fractions per se, i. e. as an expression
of which specific share of prize or burden should be allotted to every option.
In consonance with such a quantitative character, we require a continuous
dependence of the mixing fractions on the preference scores.
On the other hand, the mixing-fraction character that we are looking for
calls also for the following condition of unanimous decomposition, that
we divide in two parts: (a) If every option from a set X is unanimously
preferred to any option from outside X , then the mixing fractions should
vanish outside of X . In particular, if an option is unanimously preferred to
any other, then it should get a mixing fraction equal to 1 and all the other
mixing fractions should be equal to 0. (b) In the complete case the following
converse statement should hold too: If X is the set of options that get non-
vanishing fractions, then each option from X is unanimously preferred to any
option from outside X ; besides, X is the minimal set with this property.
Consider, for instance, the preferences
60 : a>b>c>d, 40 : b>a>d>c, (5)
whose corresponding Llull matrix is
a 60 100 100
40 b 100 100
0 0 c 60
0 0 40 d
. (6)
According to the condition of unanimous decomposition, in such a situation
the only options with non-vanishing fractions should be a and b. Notice also
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that in the case of example (1–2) part (b) of the condition of unanimous
decomposition requires that every option should receive a positive fraction.
Our problem can be seen as a special case of a more general one where a
matrix of paired-comparison scores is to be summed up into a set of prior-
ity ratings (not necessarily with the character of mixing fractions). Such a
problem arises not only in preferential voting, but also in sport tournaments,
psychometrics, multi-criteria decision theory, web search engine rankings, et
cetera. See for instance [4, 9, 15 ].
However, voting has a special character in that the comparisons are de-
cided by human individuals. Because of this, it becomes advisable to comply
with certain majority principles. In the paired-comparison setting, the stan-
dard formulation is the Condorcet principle (see [16 : ch. 1, § 4.2], [20 : § 7.2]
and [23 : p. 153–154]): If the preference scores of a particular option over the
others are all of them greater than half the number of voters, then that op-
tion should be socially preferred to any other. In our setting, being socially
preferred means simply getting a larger fraction. More generally, we will
consider also the following extended version, which was introduced in 1973
by John H. Smith [21 : § 5] (except for the provision of vanishing fractions)
and will be referred to as Condorcet-Smith principle: If the options are
partitioned in two sets X and Y so that every member of X is preferred
to any member of Y by more than half of the voters, then every member of
X should get a larger fraction than any member of Y unless both fractions
vanish.
According to this condition, in the case of example (1–2) the mixing
fractions should decrease along the order a > b > c > d (take successively
X = {a}, {a, b}, {a, b, c}).
As we will see, the conditions of single-choice voting consistency, con-
tinuity and unanimous decomposition are satisfied by a celebrated method
that was introduced in 1929 by Ernst Zermelo in the context of chess tourna-
ments [25 ]. However, Zermelo’s method by itself does not comply with the
Condorcet principle. In fact, it need not give the largest fraction to an option
that is placed first by more than half of the voters. For instance, in the case
of example (1–2) it gives the following fractions: a: 0.303, b: 0.387, c: 0.201
d: 0.109, where b gets the largest fraction in spite of the fact that a has a
majority of first placings. As we will show in this article, this problem disap-
pears when Zermelo’s method is preceded by the CLC projection that is
introduced in [1, 2 ] (‘CLC’ stands for “Continuous Llull-Condorcet”). In the
case of (1–2), this combined procedure gives the following results: a: 0.323,
b: 0.288, c: 0.217 d: 0.173.
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The resulting method, that is, the CLC projection followed by Zermelo’s
method, combines, among others, the following properties: fraction charac-
ter, including the above-mentioned conditions of single-choice voting consis-
tency and unanimous decomposition, continuity with respect to the origi-
nal preference scores, and compliance with the Condorcet-Smith principle.
To our knowledge, the previous literature does not offer any other rating
method with these properties.
The reader interested to try the proposed method can use the CLC cal-
culator which has been made available at [19 ].
This article is structured as follows: In Section 1 we introduce some gen-
eral terminology and notation. Section 2 is devoted to Zermelo’s method by
itself, with some new results, especially in connection with the continuous
dependence of the ratings on the data in the reducible case. Section 3 looks
at certain properties of the paired-comparison matrices that arise from the
CLC projection of [1, 2 ]. Section 4 combines the previous results to show
that the concatenation of the CLC projection and Zermelo’s method achieves
the desired properties. Finally, in Section 5 we ask ourselves for the possibil-
ity of other methods with the same properties and we discuss some related
questions.
1 Terminology and notation
1.1 We consider a finite set A. Its elements represent the options which are
the matter of a vote. The number of elements of A will be denoted by N .
We will be based upon the numbers of voters who expressed a preference
for x over y , where x and y vary over all ordered pairs of different options.
These numbers will be denoted by Vxy . Instead of them, most of the time we
will be dealing with the fractions vxy = Vxy/V , where V denotes the total
number of votes. We will refer to Vxy and vxy respectively as the absolute
and relative preference scores associated with the ordered pair xy, and
the whole collection of these scores will be called the (absolute or relative)
Llull matrix of the vote.
The preference scores are obviously bound to satisfy the inequality
vxy + vyx ≤ 1. (7)
A matrix of preference scores satisfying vxy + vyx = 1 for any x and y will
be said to be complete.
Incomplete Llull matrices arise when preferences are not expressed by
some voters on some pairs of options. In this connection, one must be care-
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ful to distinguish a definite indifference about two options from a lack of
information about them. One voter who expresses a definite indifference
about x and y should be considered equivalent to half a voter preferring x
to y plus another half a voter preferring y to x. In contrast, a voter who
gives no information about whether he prefers x to y or viceversa should be
counted neither in Vxy nor in Vyx.
In this spirit, a ballot that confines to choosing a single option should be
interpreted as expressing nothing else than a preference for that option over
any other. Therefore, in the case of single-choice voting —where everybody
votes in this way— the Llull matrix takes the form vxy = fx for any y 6= x,
where fx is the fraction of the vote that chooses x.
Besides the scores vxy , in the sequel we will often deal with the margins
mxy and the turnouts txy , which are defined respectively by
mxy = vxy − vyx, txy = vxy + vyx. (8)
Obviously, their dependence on the pair xy is respectively antisymmetric
and symmetric, that is
myx = −mxy, tyx = txy. (9)
It is clear also that the scores vxy and vyx can be recovered from mxy and
txy by means of the formulas
vxy = (txy +mxy)/2, vyx = (txy −mxy)/2. (10)
Instead of the margins mxy = vxy− vyx , sometimes, especially in decision
theory, one considers the ratios pxy = vxy/vyx (which requires the prefer-
ence scores to be all of them positive). Alternatively, one can consider the
relative scores qxy = vxy/txy (which only requires the turnouts to be posi-
tive). Obviously, the matrix of relative preference scores is always complete.
The ratios and the relative scores are related to each other by the formulas
pxy = qxy/(1− qxy), qxy = pxy/(1 + pxy). Notice however that in the incom-
plete case neither the margins, nor the ratios, nor the relative scores, allow
to recover the original scores, unless one knows also the turnouts txy .
In order to refer to it as a whole, the Llull matrix made of the preference
scores vxy will be denoted as (vxy), or alternatively as V . We will also use
the notation VRS to mean the restriction of (vxy) to x ∈ R and y ∈ S ,
where R and S are arbitrary non-empty subsets of A. Similarly, if (ux) is
a collection of numbers indexed by x ∈ A, its restriction to x ∈ R will be
denoted as uR .
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1.2 The simplest rating of the overall acceptance of an option x is its
mean preference score, that is, the arithmetic mean of its preference
scores against all the other options:
ρx =
1
N − 1
∑
y 6=x
vxy. (11)
This quantity is linearly related to the rank-based count proposed in 1433 by
Nikolaus von Kues [16 : § 1.4.3, § 4] and again in 1770–1784 by Jean-Charles
de Borda [16 : § 1.5.2, § 5] (both of them being restricted to the complete case).
More specifically, their count amounts to 1 + (N − 1)ρx = (1 − ρx) + ρxN .
Instead of it, in [1, 2 ] we considered the mean ranks r¯x , which are given
by
r¯x = N − (N − 1) ρx = ρx + (1− ρx)N. (12)
Notice that, contrarily to ρx , lower mean ranks correspond to a higher ac-
ceptance. The ratings Rx that were considered in [1, 2 ] are nothing else
than the mean ranks that are obtained after transforming the Llull matrix
by means of the CLC projection.
The mean preference scores ρx can certainly be rescaled to add up to 1.
More interestingly, in the case of single-choice voting they fulfil the require-
ment of coinciding with the vote fractions fx . In fact, having vxy = fx for any
y 6= x certainly implies ρx = fx . However, they definitely do not satisfy the
condition of unanimous decomposition. For instance, for A = {a, b, c} with
vab = vac = vbc = 1 (which implies vba = vca = vcb = 0) a is unanimously
preferred to both b and c but ρb = 1/2 > 0.
1.3 As we mentioned in the introduction, our goal will be achieved by
means of Zermelo’s method together with a prior application of the CLC
projection. In connection with Zermelo’s method, we need to introduce a
qualitative notion of priority that also bears relation to the CLC projection.
In order to define it, we will make use of the indirect scores v∗xy : given
x and y , one considers all possible paths x0x1 . . . xn going from x0 = x
to xn = y ; every such path is associated with the score of its weakest link,
i. e. the smallest value of vxixi+1 ; finally, v
∗
xy is defined as the maximum value
of this associated score over all paths from x to y . In other words,
v∗xy = max
x0 = x
xn = y
min
i ≥ 0
i < n
vxixi+1, (13)
where the max operator considers all possible paths from x to y , and the
min operator considers all the links of a particular path. For instance, the
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indirect scores for the Llull matrix (2) are as follows:
(V ∗xy) =
a 10 12 12
8 b 15 15
8 8 c 16
8 8 8 d
. (14)
By the definition of v∗xy , the inequality v
∗
xy > 0 clearly defines a transitive
relation. In the following we will denote it by the symbol D . Thus,
x D y ⇐⇒ v∗xy > 0. (15)
Associated with it, it is interesting to consider also the following derived rela-
tions, which keep the property of transitivity and are respectively symmetric
and asymmetric:
x ≡ y ⇐⇒ v∗xy > 0 and v∗yx > 0, (16)
x ⊲ y ⇐⇒ v∗xy > 0 and v∗yx = 0. (17)
Therefore, ≡ is an equivalence relation and ⊲ is a partial order. In the
following, the situation where x ⊲ y will be expressed by saying that x
dominates y .
The equivalence classes of A by ≡ are called the irreducible compo-
nents of A (for V). If there is only one of them, namely A itself, then
one says that the matrix V is irreducible. So, V is irreducible if and only if
v∗xy > 0 for any x, y ∈ A. It is not difficult to see that this property is
equivalent to the following one formulated in terms of the direct scores only:
there is no splitting of A into two classes X and Y so that vyx = 0 for any
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ; in other words, there is no ordering of A for which the
matrix V takes the form (
VXX VXY
O VY Y
)
, (18)
where VXX and VY Y are square matrices and O is a zero matrix. Besides,
a subset X ⊆ A is an irreducible component if and only if X is maximal,
in the sense of set inclusion, for the property of VXX being irreducible. On the
other hand, it also happens that the relation ⊲ is compatible with the
equivalence relation ≡ , i. e. if x ≡ x¯ and y ≡ y¯ then x ⊲ y implies x¯ ⊲ y¯ .
As a consequence, the relation ⊲ can be applied also to the irreducible
components of A for V . In the following we will be interested in the case
where V is irreducible, or more generally, when there is a top dominant
irreducible component , i. e. an irreducible component which dominates
any other irreducible component.
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2 Zermelo’s method of strengths
The Llull matrix of a vote among V voters can be viewed as a tournament
between the members of A. In fact, it is as if x and y had played Txy = txyV
matches (the number of voters who made a comparison between x and y ,
even if some of these voters considered x at the same level as y ) and Vxy =
vxyV of these matches had been won by x, whereas the other Vyx = vyxV
had been won by y (one tied match is counted as half a match in favour of
x plus half a match in favour of y ). It was in such a scenario that Zermelo
devised in 1929 his rating method [25 ]. Later on, the same method has been
rediscovered by several other autors (see [22, 11 ] and the references therein).
Zermelo’s method is based upon a probabilistic model for the outcome
of a match between two items x and y . This model assumes that such a
match is won by x with probability ϕx/(ϕx+ϕy) whereas it is won by y with
probability ϕy/(ϕx + ϕy), where ϕx is a non-negative parameter associated
with each player x, usually referred to as its strength. If all matches are
independent events, the probability of obtaining a particular system of values
for the scores (Vxy) is given by
P =
∏
{x,y}
(
Txy
Vxy
)(
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
)Vxy ( ϕy
ϕx + ϕy
)Vyx
, (19)
where the product runs through all unordered pairs {x, y} ⊆ A with x 6= y .
Notice that P depends only on the strength ratios; in other words, multi-
plying all the strengths by the same value has no effect on the result. On
account of this, we will normalize the strengths by requiring their sum to
be equal to 1. In order to include certain extreme cases, one must allow for
some of the strengths to vanish. However, this may conflict with P being
well defined, since it could lead to indeterminacies of the type 0/0 or 00 .
So, one should be careful in connection with vanishing strengths. With all
this in mind, for the moment we will let the strengths vary in the following
set:
Q = {ϕ ∈ RA | ϕx > 0 for all x ∈ A,
∑
x∈A
ϕx = 1 }. (20)
Together with this set, in the following we will consider also its closure Q,
which includes vanishing strengths, and its boundary ∂Q = Q \ Q. As it
will be seen below, Zermelo’s method corresponds to a maximum likelihood
estimate of the parameters ϕx from a given set of actual values of Vxy (and
of Txy = Vxy + Vyx ). In other words, given the values of Vxy , one looks for
the values of ϕx which maximize the probability P .
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The hypothesis of independence which lies behind formula (19) is cer-
tainly not satisfied by the binary comparisons which arise out of preferen-
tial voting. However, it turns out that the same estimates of the parame-
ters ϕx arise from a related model where the voters are assumed to express
complete definite rankings (‘definite’ means here ‘without ties’). Both Zer-
melo’s binary model and the ranking model that we are about to introduce
can be viewed as special cases of a more general model, proposed in 1959
by Robert Duncan Luce, which considers the outcome of making a choice
out of multiple options [17 ]. According to Luce’s “choice axiom”, the prob-
abilities of two different choices x and y are in a ratio which does not
depend on which other options are present. As a consequence, it follows
that every option x can be associated a number ϕx so that the probability
of choosing x out of a set X that contains x is given by ϕx/(
∑
y∈X ϕy).
Obviously, Zermelo’s model corresponds to considering binary choices only.
However, Luce’s model also allows to associate every complete definite rank-
ing with a certain probability. In fact, such a ranking can be viewed as
the result of first choosing the winner out of the whole set A, then choos-
ing the best of the remainder, and so on. If these successive choices are
assumed to be independent events, then one can easily figure out the cor-
responding probability. Furthermore, one can see that these probabilities
make the expected rank of x equal to E(rx) = N −
∑
y 6=x ϕx/(ϕx + ϕy).
By equating these values to the mean ranks given by equations (11–12),
namely r¯x = N −
∑
y 6=x vxy —so using the so-called method of moments—
one obtains exactly the same equations for the estimated values of the pa-
rameters ϕx as in the method of maximum likelihood, namely equations
(22) below. Notice also that, in accordance with Luce’s theory of choice, the
normalization condition
∑
x∈A ϕx = 1 allows to view ϕx as the first-choice
probability of x (among non-abstainers). Anyway, i. e. independently of the
reasons behind them, the resulting values of ϕx will be seen to have good
properties for our purposes.
In the following we take the point of view of maximum likelihood. So,
given the values of Vxy , we will look for the values of ϕx which maximize
the probability P . Since Vxy and Txy = Vxy + Vyx are now fixed, this is
equivalent to maximizing the following function of the ϕx :
F (ϕ) =
∏
{x,y}
ϕx
vxy ϕy
vyx
(ϕx + ϕy)txy
, (21)
(recall that vxy = Vxy/V and txy = Txy/V where V is a positive constant
greater than or equal to any of the turnouts Txy ; going from (19) to (21)
involves taking the power of exponent 1/V and disregarding a fixed mul-
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tiplicative constant). The function F is certainly smooth on Q. Besides,
it is clearly bounded from above, since it is a product of several factors less
than or equal to 1. However, generally speaking F needs not to achieve a
maximum in Q, because this set is not compact. In the present situation,
the only general fact that one can guarantee in this connection is the exis-
tence of maximizing sequences, i. e. sequences ϕn in Q with the property
that F (ϕn) converges to the lowest upper bound F = sup {F (ψ) |ψ ∈ Q} .
The theorems of this section collect the basic results that we need about
Zermelo’s method. The first theorem is standard except for part (c). How-
ever, we prove also parts (a) and (b) because in so doing we introduce several
ideas and techniques that are used in part (c) and in other parts of the paper.
Theorem 2.1 (Zermelo, 1929 [25 ]; see also [8, 11 ]). If V is irreducible,
then:
(a) There is a unique ϕ ∈ Q which maximizes F on Q.
(b) ϕ is the solution of the following system of equations:∑
y 6=x
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
=
∑
y 6=x
vxy, (22)
∑
x
ϕx = 1, (23)
where (22) contains one equation for every x.
(c) ϕ is an infinitely differentiable function of the scores vxy as long as
they keep satisfying the hypothesis of irreducibility.
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that the hypothesis of irreducibility entails
that F can be extended to a continuous function on Q by putting F (ψ) = 0
for ψ ∈ ∂Q. In order to prove this claim we must show that F (ψn) → 0
whenever ψn converges to a point ψ ∈ ∂Q. Let us consider the following
sets associated with ψ : X = {x |ψx > 0} and Y = {y |ψy = 0} . The second
one is not empty since we are assuming ψ ∈ ∂Q, whereas the first one is not
empty because the strengths add up to the positive value 1. Now, for any
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , F (ψn) contains a factor of the form (ψny )vyx , which tends
to zero as soon as vyx > 0 (while the other factors remain bounded). So, the
only way for F (ψn) not to approach zero would be VYX = O, in contradiction
with the irreducibility of V .
After such an extension, F is a continuous function on the compact set Q.
So, there exists ϕ which maximizes F on Q. However, since F (ψ) vanishes
on ∂Q whereas it is strictly positive for ψ ∈ Q, any maximizer ϕ must
belong to Q. This establishes the existence part of (a).
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Since F is constant on every ray from the origin, maximizing it on Q
amounts to the same thing as maximizing it on the positive orthant RA+ .
On the other hand, maximizing F is certainly equivalent to maximizing
logF . Now, a maximizer of logF on RA+ must satisfy the differential condi-
tions
∂ logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx
=
∑
y 6=x
(
vxy
ϕx
− txy
ϕx + ϕy
)
= 0, (24)
where x varies over A. Multiplying each of these equations by the corre-
sponding ϕx results in the system of equations (22). That system contains
N equations for the N variables ϕx (x ∈ A); however, it is redundant:
by using the fact that vxy + vyx = txy , one easily sees that adding up all of
the equations in (22) results in a tautology. That is why one can supplement
that system with equation (23), which selects the maximizer in Q.
Let us see now that the maximizer is unique. Instead of following the
interesting proof given by Zermelo, here we will prefer to follow [11 ], which
will have the advantage of preparing matters for part (c). More specifically,
the uniqueness will be obtained by seeing that any critical point of logF
as a function on Q, i. e. any solution of (22–23), is a strict local maximum;
this implies that there is only one critical point, because otherwise one should
have other kinds of critical points [6 : §VI.6] (we are invoking the so-called
mountain pass theorem; here we are using the fact that logF tends to −∞
as ϕ approaches ∂Q). In order to study the character of a critical point we
will look at the second derivatives of logF with respect to ϕ . By differen-
tiating (24), one obtains that
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx2
= −
∑
y 6=x
(
vxy
ϕ2x
− txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
)
, (25)
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx ∂ϕy
=
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
, for x 6= y. (26)
On the other hand, when ϕ is a critical point, equation (22) transforms (25)
into the following expression:
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx2
= −
∑
y 6=x
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
ϕy
ϕx
. (27)
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So, the Hessian quadratic form is as follows:∑
x,y
(
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx ∂ϕy
)
ψx ψy = −
∑
x,y 6=x
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
(
ϕy
ϕx
ψ2x − ψxψy
)
= −
∑
x,y 6=x
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2 ϕxϕy
(
ϕ2yψ
2
x − ϕxϕyψxψy
)
= −
∑
{x,y}
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2 ϕxϕy
(ϕyψx − ϕxψy)2 ,
(28)
where the last sum runs through all unordered pairs {x, y} ⊆ A with x 6= y .
The last expression is non-positive and it vanishes if and only if ψx/ϕx =
ψy/ϕy for any x, y ∈ A (the “only if” part is immediate when txy > 0;
for arbitrary x and y , the hypothesis of irreducibility allows to connect
them through a path x0x1 . . . xn (x0 = x, xn = y ) with the property that
txixi+1 ≥ vxixi+1 > 0 for any i, so that one gets ψx/ϕx = ψx1/ϕx1 = · · · =
ψy/ϕy ). So, the vanishing of (28) happens if and only if ψ = λϕ for some
scalar λ . However, when ψ is restricted to variations such that ϕ+ψ stays
in Q, i. e. to vectors ψ ∈ RA satisfying ∑x ψx = 0, the case ψ = λϕ reduces
to λ = 0 and therefore ψ = 0 (since
∑
x ϕx is positive). So, the Hessian
is negative definite when restricted to such variations. This ensures that ϕ
is a strict local maximum of logF as a function on Q. In fact, one easily
arrives at such a conclusion when Taylor’s formula is used to analyse the
behaviour of logF (ϕ+ ψ) for small ψ satisfying
∑
x ψx = 0.
Finally, let us consider part (c), that is, the dependence of ϕ ∈ Q on the
matrix V . To begin with, we notice that the set I of irreducible matrices
is open since it is a finite intersection of open sets, namely one open set for
each splitting of A into two sets X and Y . The dependence of ϕ ∈ Q on V
is due to the presence of vxy and txy = vxy+vyx in the equations (22–23)
which determine ϕ . However, we are not in the standard setting of the
implicit function theorem, since we are dealing with a system of N+1 equa-
tions whilst ϕ varies in a space of dimension N−1. In order to place oneself
in a standard setting, it is convenient here to replace the condition of nor-
malization
∑
x ϕx = 1 by the alternative one ϕa = 1, where a is a fixed
element of A. This change of normalization corresponds to mapping Q to
U = {ϕ ∈ RA |ϕx > 0 for all x ∈ A, ϕa = 1 } by means of the diffeo-
morphism g : ϕ 7→ ϕ/ϕa , which has the property that F (g(ϕ)) = F (ϕ).
By an argument of the same kind as that used at the end of the preceding
paragraph, one sees that the Hessian bilinear form of logF is negative defi-
nite when restricted to variations so as to stay in U . Therefore, if we take as
coordinates on U the ϕx with x ∈ A \ {a} =: A′ , the function F restricted
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to U has the property that the matrix ( ∂2 logF (ϕ)/∂ϕx∂ϕy | x, y ∈A′) is
negative definite and therefore invertible, which entails that the system of
equations ( ∂ logF (ϕ,V)/∂ϕx = 0 | x ∈ A′) —where we made explicit the
dependence on V— determines ϕ ∈ U as a smooth function of V ∈ I .
The next theorem is the core result for ensuring at the same time both
the condition of unanimous decomposition and the continuity of the ratings
with respect to the data. Let us recall that a maximizing sequence means a
sequence ϕn ∈ Q such that F (ϕn) approaches the lowest upper bound of F
on Q.
Theorem 2.2 (Statements (a) and (b) are contained in [25 ]). Assume that
there exists a top dominant irreducible component X . In this case:
(a) There is a unique ϕ ∈ Q such that any maximizing sequence con-
verges to ϕ.
(b) ϕA\X = 0, whereas ϕX has all components positive and coincides
with the solution of a system analogous to (22–23) where x and y
vary only within X .
(c) ϕ is a continuous function of the scores vxy as long as they keep
satisfying the hypotheses of the present theorem.
Remark. The below given proof of statements (a) and (b) follows [25 : p. 440–
442]. Again, we include it because it prepares the path for the proof of (c).
Partial results related to (c) are contained in [5 :Thm. 1.1]. However, they
consider only a special way of varying the scores vxy, namely adding a com-
mon ε ↓ 0 to all the scores. Besides, their proof uses some tools from
algebraic geometry, whereas ours stays in the domain of calculus.
Proof. The definition of the lowest upper bound immediately implies the
existence of maximizing sequences. On the other hand, the compactness of Q
guarantees that any maximizing sequence has a subsequence which converges
in Q. Let ϕn and ϕ denote respectively one of such convergent maximizing
sequences and its limit. In the following we will see that ϕ must be the
unique point specified in statement (b). This entails that any maximizing
sequence converges itself to ϕ (without extracting a subsequence).
So, our aim is now statement (b). From now on we will write Y = A\X ,
and a general element of RA+ will be denoted by ψ . For convenience, in this
part of the proof we will replace the condition
∑
x ψx = 1 by
∑
x ψx ≤ 1
(and similarly for ϕn and ϕ); since F (λψ) = F (ψ) for any λ > 0, the
properties that we will obtain will be easily translated from Q̂ = {ψ ∈ RA |
ψx > 0 for all x ∈ A,
∑
x∈A ψx ≤ 1 } to Q. On the other hand, it will
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also be convenient to consider first the case where Y is also an irreducible
component. In such a case, it is interesting to rewrite F (ψ) as a product of
three factors:
F (ψ) = FXX(ψX)FYY (ψY )FXY (ψX , ψY ), (29)
namely:
FXX(ψX) =
∏
{x,x¯}⊆X
ψx
vxx¯ ψx¯
vx¯x
(ψx + ψx¯)txx¯
, (30)
FYY (ψY ) =
∏
{y,y¯}⊆Y
ψy
vyy¯ ψy¯
vy¯y
(ψy + ψy¯)tyy¯
, (31)
FXY (ψX , ψY ) =
∏
x∈X
y∈Y
(
ψx
ψx + ψy
)vxy
, (32)
where we used that vyx = 0 and txy = vxy . Now, let us look at the effect
of replacing ψY by λψY without varying ψX . The values of FXX and FYY
remain unchanged, but that of FXY varies in the following way:
FXY (ψX , λψY )
FXY (ψX , ψY )
=
∏
x∈X
y∈Y
(
ψx + ψy
ψx + λψy
)vxy
. (33)
In particular, for 0 < λ < 1 each of the factors of the right-hand side of (33)
is greater than or equal to 1. This remark leads to the following argument.
First, we can see that ϕny/ϕ
n
x → 0 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that vxy > 0
(such pairs xy exist because of the hypothesis that X dominates Y ). Oth-
erwise, the preceding remark entails that the sequence ϕ˜n = (ϕn
X
, λϕn
Y
) with
0 < λ < 1 would satisfy F (ϕ˜n) > KF (ϕn) for some K > 1 and infinitely
many n, in contradiction with the hypothesis that ϕn was a maximizing
sequence. On the other hand, we see also that FXY (ϕ
n) approaches its low-
est upper bound, namely 1. Having achieved such a property, the problem
of maximizing F reduces to separately maximizing FXX and FYY , which is
solved by Theorem 2.1. For the moment we are dealing with relative strengths
only, i. e. without any normalizing condition like (23). So, we see that FYY
gets optimized when each of the ratios ϕny/ϕ
n
y¯ (y, y¯ ∈ Y ) approaches the ho-
mologous one for the unique maximizer of FYY , and analogously with FXX .
Since these ratios are finite positive quantities, the statement that ϕny/ϕ
n
x → 0
becomes extended to any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y whatsoever (since one can write
ϕny/ϕ
n
x = (ϕ
n
y/ϕ
n
y¯ )×(ϕny¯/ϕnx¯)×(ϕnx¯/ϕnx) with vx¯y¯ > 0). Let us recover now the
condition
∑
x∈A ϕ
n
x = 1. The preceding facts imply that ϕ
n
Y
→ 0, whereas
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ϕn
X
converges to the unique maximizer of FXX . This establishes (b) as well
as the uniqueness part of (a).
The general case where Y decomposes into several irreducible compo-
nents, all of them dominated by X , can be taken care of by induction over
the different irreducible components of A. At each step, one deals with
an irreducible component Z with the property of being minimal, in the
sense of the dominance relation ⊲ , among those which are still pending.
By means of an argument analogous to that of the preceding paragraph, one
sees that: (i) ϕnz/ϕ
n
x → 0 for any z ∈ Z and x such that x ⊲ z with
vxz > 0; (ii) the ratios ϕ
n
z/ϕ
n
z¯ (z, z¯ ∈ Z) approach the homologous ones
for the unique maximizer of FZZ ; and (iii) ϕ
n
R
is a maximizing sequence for
FRR , where R denotes the union of the pending components, Z excluded.
Once this induction process has been completed, one can combine its partial
results to show that ϕnz/ϕ
n
x → 0 for any x ∈ X and z 6∈ X (it suffices to
consider a path x0x1 . . . xn from x0 ∈ X to xn = z with the property that
vxixi+1 > 0 for any i and to notice that each of the factors ϕ
n
xi+1
/ϕnxi remains
bounded while at least one of them tends to zero). As above, one concludes
that ϕn
A\X → 0, whereas ϕnX converges to the unique maximizer of FXX .
The two following remarks will be useful in the proof of part (c):
(1) According to the proof above, ϕX is determined (up to a multiplicative
constant) by equations (22) with x and y varying only within X :
Gx(ϕX ,V) :=
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
−
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
vxy = 0, ∀x ∈ X. (34)
However, since y ∈ A \X implies on the one hand ϕy = 0 and on the other
hand txy = vxy , each of the preceding equations is equivalent to a similar one
where y varies over the whole of A \ {x} :
Ĝx(ϕ,V) :=
∑
y∈A
y 6=x
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
−
∑
y∈A
y 6=x
vxy = 0, ∀x ∈ X. (35)
(2) Also, it is interesting to see the result of adding up the equations (35) for
all x in some subset W of X . Using the fact that vxy + vyx = txy , one sees
that such an addition results in the following equality:∑
x∈W
y 6∈W
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
−
∑
x∈W
y 6∈W
vxy = 0, ∀W ⊆ X. (36)
Let us proceed now with the proof of (c). In the following, V and V˜
denote respectively a fixed matrix satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem
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and a slight perturbation of it. In the following we systematically use a
tilde to distinguish between homologous objects associated respectively with
V and V˜ ; in particular, such a notation will be used in connection with the
labels of certain equations. Our aim is to show that ϕ˜ approaches ϕ as V˜
approaches V . In this connection we will use the little-o and big-O notations
made popular by Edmund Landau (who, by the way, wrote also on the rating
of chess players [13, 14 ], as we will see in § 5.1). This notation refers here to
functions of V˜ and their behaviour as V˜ approaches V ; if f and g are two
such functions, f = o(g) means that for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0
such that ‖V˜ − V‖ ≤ δ implies ‖f(V˜)‖ ≤ ǫ ‖g(V˜)‖ ; on the other hand,
f = O(g) means that there exist M and δ > 0 such that ‖V˜ − V‖ ≤ δ
implies ‖f(V˜)‖ ≤M ‖g(V˜)‖ .
Obviously, if V˜ is near enough to V then vxy > 0 implies v˜xy > 0.
As a consequence, x D y implies x D˜ y . In particular, the irreducibility
of VXX entails that V˜XX is also irreducible. Therefore, X is entirely contained
in some irreducible component X˜ of A for V˜ . Besides, X˜ is a top dominant
irreducible component for V˜ ; in fact, we have the following chain of impli-
cations for x ∈ X ⊆ X˜ : y 6∈ X˜ ⇒ y 6∈ X ⇒ x ⊲ y ⇒ x D˜ y ⇒ x ⊲˜ y ,
where we have used successively: the inclusion X ⊆ X˜ , the hypothesis
that X is top dominant for V , the fact that V˜ is near enough to V , and
the hypothesis that y does not belong to the irreducible component X˜ .
Now, according to part (b) and remark (1) from p. 16–16, ϕX and ϕ˜X˜ are de-
termined respectively by the systems (34) and (3˜4), or equivalently by (35)
and (3˜5), whereas ϕA\X and ϕ˜A\X˜ are both of them equal to zero. So we must
show that ϕ˜y = o(1) for any y ∈ X˜ \X , and that ϕ˜x − ϕx = o(1) for any
x ∈ X . The proof is organized in three main steps.
Step (1). ϕ˜y = O(ϕ˜x) whenever vxy > 0. For the moment, we assume
V˜ fixed (near enough to V so that v˜xy > 0) and x, y ∈ X˜ . Under these
hypotheses one can argue as follows: Since ϕ˜X˜ maximizes F˜X˜X˜ , the corre-
sponding value of F˜X˜X˜ can be bounded from below by any particular value
of the same function. On the other hand, we can bound it from above by the
factor (ϕ˜x/(ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y))
v˜xy . So, we can write
(
1
2
)N(N−1)
2 ≤
(
1
2
) ∑
{p,q}⊆X˜
t˜pq
= F˜X˜X˜(ψ) ≤ F˜X˜X˜(ϕ˜X˜) ≤
(
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
)˜vxy
, (37)
where ψ has been taken so that ψq has the same value for all q ∈ X˜ . The
preceding inequality entails that
ϕ˜y ≤
(
2N(N−1) / v˜xy − 1) ϕ˜x. (38)
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Now, this inequality holds not only for x, y ∈ X˜ , but it is also trivially true
for y 6∈ X˜ , since then one has ϕ˜y = 0. On the other hand, the case y ∈
X˜, x 6∈ X˜ is not possible at all, because the hypothesis that v˜xy > 0 would
then contradict the fact that X˜ is a top dominant irreducible component.
Finally, we let V˜ vary towards V . The desired result is a consequence of (38)
since v˜xy approaches vxy > 0.
Step (2). ϕ˜y = o(ϕ˜x) for any x ∈ X and y 6∈ X . Again, we will consider
first the special case where vxy > 0. In this case the result is easily obtained
as a consequence of the equality (3˜6) for W = X :∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
t˜xy
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
−
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
v˜xy = 0. (39)
In fact, this equality implies that∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
t˜xy
(
1− ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
)
=
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
v˜yx. (40)
Now, it is clear that the right-hand side of this equation is o(1) and that each
of the terms of the left-hand side is positive or zero. Since t˜xy − vxy = t˜xy −
txy = o(1), the hypothesis that vxy > 0 allows to conclude that ϕ˜x/(ϕ˜x+ ϕ˜y)
approaches 1, or equivalently, ϕ˜y = o(ϕ˜x). Let us consider now the case of
any x ∈ X and y 6∈ X . Since X is top dominant, we know that there exists
a path x0x1 . . . xn from x0 = x to xn = y such that vxixi+1 > 0 for all i.
According to step (1) we have ϕ˜xi+1 = O(ϕ˜xi). On the other hand, there
must be some j such that xj ∈ X but xj+1 6∈ X , which has been seen to
imply that ϕ˜xj+1 = o(ϕ˜xj ). By combining these facts one obtains the desired
result.
Step (3). ϕ˜x − ϕx = o(1) for any x ∈ X . Consider the equations (3˜5)
for x ∈ X and split the sums in two parts depending on whether y ∈ X or
y 6∈ X : ∑
y∈X
y 6=x
t˜xy
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
−
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
v˜xy =
∑
y 6∈X
(v˜xy − t˜xy ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
). (41)
The last sum is o(1) since step (2) ensures that ϕ˜y = o(ϕ˜x) and we also know
that t˜xy − v˜xy = v˜yx = o(1) (because x ∈ X and y 6∈ X ). So ϕ˜ satisfies a
system of the following form, where x and y vary only within X and w˜xy
is a slight modification of v˜xy which absorbs the right-hand side of (41):
Hx(ϕ˜X , V˜, W˜) :=
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
t˜xy
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
−
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
w˜xy = 0, ∀x ∈ X. (42)
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Here, the second argument of H refers to the dependence on V˜ through t˜xy .
We know that t˜xy − txy = o(1) and also that w˜xy − vxy = (w˜xy − v˜xy) +
(v˜xy − vxy) = o(1). So we are interested in the preceding equation near the
point (ϕX ,V,V). Now, in this point we have H(ϕX ,V,V) = G(ϕX ,V) = 0,
as well as (∂Hx/∂ϕ˜y)(ϕX ,V,V) = (∂Gx/∂ϕy)(ϕX ,V). Therefore, the im-
plicit function theorem can be applied similarly as in Theorem 2.1, with
the result that ϕ˜X = S(V˜, W˜), where S is a smooth function that satis-
fies S(V,V) = ϕX . In particular, the continuity of S allows to conclude that
ϕ˜X approaches ϕX , since we know that both V˜ and W˜ approach V .
Finally, by combining the results of steps (2) and (3) one obtains ϕ˜y=o(1)
for any y 6∈ X .
Remarks
1. Part (a) states that every maximizing sequence converges towards
a particular φ in Q. The converse statement is false: converging towards
this φ is not a sufficient condition for being a maximizing sequence. The
preceding proof shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for ϕn to be
a maximizing sequence is that the ratios ϕnz/ϕ
n
y tend to 0 whenever y ⊲ z ,
whereas, for y ≡ z , i. e. if y and z belong to the same irreducible component
Z , they approach the homologous ratios for the unique maximizer of FZZ .
2. If there is not a dominant component, then the maximizing sequences
can have multiple limit points.
3. The non-linear system (22–23) can be solved by the following iterative
scheme [25, 8 ]:
∑
y 6=x
txy
ϕ
(n+1)
x
ϕ
(n)
x + ϕ
(n)
y
=
∑
y 6=x
vxy, (43)
∑
x
ϕ(n+1)x = 1, (44)
3 CLC structure
This section is devoted to paired-comparison matrices with a certain special
structure, namely the structure that arises from the CLC projection that we
introduced in [1, 2 ]. As we will see, these matrices have good properties in
connection with Zermelo’s method and with the dominance relation that was
defined in § 1.3.
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3.1 A paired-comparison matrix will be said to have CLC structure, or
to be a CLC matrix, when there exists a total order ξ on A such that
vxy ≥ vyx, whenever x ≻ξ y, (45)
vxz = max (vxy, vyz), whenever x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z, (46)
vzx = min (vzy, vyx), whenever x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z, (47)
0 ≤ txz − tx′z ≤ mxx′, whenever z 6∈ {x, x′}, (48)
where x ≻ξ y means that x precedes y in the order ξ , and x′ denotes the
element of A that immediately follows x in the order ξ . In such a situation
the total order ξ will be called an admissible order for the matrix (vxy).
Our interest in the CLC structure derives from the following fact:
Theorem 3.1 ([2 :Thm. 4.5]). The CLC projection always results in a CLC ma-
trix. Besides, a CLC matrix is invariant by the CLC projection.
For instance, in the case of the Llull matrix (2) the CLC projection results
in the following CLC matrix:
(V πxy) =
a 10 11 11
8 b 11 11
7 7 c 11
7 7 7 d
. (49)
Most of this paper —the only exceptions are the proofs of Proposition 4.3
and Theorem 4.6— does not depend on the details of the CLC projection
procedure, which are given in [1, 2 ].
In the following we will also make use of the following facts:
Lemma 3.2. A CLC matrix satisfies the following inequalities:
vxz ≥ vyz, vzx ≤ vzy, whenever x ≻ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}, (50)
txz ≥ tyz, tzx ≥ tzy, whenever x ≻ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}. (51)
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that it suffices to prove the following par-
ticular inequalities:
vzx ≤ vzy, whenever x ≻ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}, (52)
txz ≥ tyz, whenever x ≻ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}. (53)
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In fact, (53) contains both inequalities of (51) since tαβ = tβα , and the first
inequality of (50) follows from (52) and (53) since tαβ = vαβ+vβα . In order to
prove (52–53) we will distinguish three cases: (i) x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z ; (ii) z ≻ξ x ≻ξ y ;
(iii) x ≻ξ z ≻ξ y .
Case (i) : x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z . In this case, the inequality (52) derives from (47).
On the other hand, (53) follows by an iterated application of the first in-
equality of (48): txz ≥ tx′z ≥ · · · ≥ tyz.
Case (ii) : z ≻ξ x ≻ξ y . This case is analogous to the preceding one, with
the only difference that it relies on (46) instead of (47).
Case (iii) : x ≻ξ z ≻ξ y . In order to deal with this case, we will start by
the special subcase where x, z, y are consecutive in the order ξ , i. e. we will
start by the inequalities
vx′x ≤ vx′x′′ , (54)
txx′ ≥ tx′′x′ . (55)
These inequalities are obtained by adding up two particular cases of (48),
namely the one where z is replaced by x′′ and the one where x and z are
replaced respectively by x′ and x. In fact, this addition results in
0 ≤ txx′ − tx′x′′ ≤ mx′x′′ +mxx′ , (56)
whose two inequalities give respectively (55) and (54). Finally, the general
situation x ≻ξ z ≻ξ y can be dealt with by combining (55) and (54) with the
results of cases (i) and (ii): In fact, if a denotes the immediate predecessor
of z in the order ξ , we can write
vzx ≤ vza ≤ vzz′ ≤ vzy,
txz ≥ taz ≥ tz′z ≥ tyz .
Proposition 3.3. A non-vanishing CLC matrix has a top dominant irre-
ducible component X with the special property that
vxy > 0, whenever x ∈ X and y 6= x. (57)
Proof. If vxy > 0 for all x, y , then (vxy) is irreducible and we are done. So,
let us assume that vxy = 0 for some x, y . By (45) and (47), this implies the
existence of some p such that vp′p = 0. Here we are considering an arbitrary
admissible order ξ , which we fix for the rest of the proof. Let a be the first
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element of A according to this order. We will see that the top dominant
component is the set X defined by
X =
{
{x ∈ A | vp′p > 0 for all p ≻ξ x}, if vp′p > 0 for some p,
{a}, if vp′p = 0 for any p.
From this definition it immediately follows that having x ∈ X and y 6∈ X
implies x ≻ξ y . This fact will be used repeatedly in the following.
From the definition, it is also clear that for any x ∈ X and y 6∈ X there
exists p with x ≻−
ξ
p ≻ξ y such that vp′p = 0. By virtue of (47), it follows that
vyx = 0, whenever x ∈ X and y 6∈ X . (58)
The claim that X is the top dominant component will be a consequence of
the preceding property together with (57), to which we devote the rest of the
proof.
Let us begin by seeing that vaa′ > 0. In fact, according to (45) having
vaa′ = 0 would imply va′a = 0 and therefore taa′ = 0; by (51), this would
imply the vanishing of the whole matrix (vxy), against one of the assump-
tions. Now, by virtue of (50) it follows that vay > 0 for all y 6= a. This
finishes the proof if X consists of a only. In the other cases, observe first
that the definition of X combined with (45) and (47) ensures vxx¯ > 0 for
all x, x¯ ∈ X. Finally, (50) allows to derive that vxy > 0 for all x ∈ X and
y 6∈ X , which completes the proof.
Lemma 3.4. A non-vanishing CLC matrix has the following properties,
where ξ is any admissible order, ρx are the mean preference scores, and X
is the top dominant component:
(a) x ≻ξ y implies ρx ≥ ρy .
(b) ρx > ρy implies the inequalities (45) and (50).
(c) ρx = ρy implies that (45) and (50) hold with equality signs.
(d) ρx = ρy if and only if vxy = vyx .
(e) ρx > ρy if and only if vxy > vyx .
(f) ρx > ρy whenever x ∈ X and y 6∈ X .
Proof. Let us recall that the mean preference scores ρx are defined by equa-
tion (11). From that equation it follows that
(N − 1)(ρx − ρy) = (vxy − vyx) +
∑
z 6=x,y
(vxz − vyz). (59)
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In the sequel we will use also the fact that, according to the definition of
CLC matrix and Lemma 3.2,
x ≻ξ y ⇒ inequalities (45) and (50), namely:
vxy ≥ vyx, vxz ≥ vyz, vzx ≤ vzy, for any z 6∈ {x, y}.
(60)
Statement (a) is an immediate consequence of combining (59) and (60).
Since ξ is a total order, the contrapositive of (a) amounts to say that ρx > ρy
implies x ≻ξ y . Combining this implication with (60) gives (b). Let us now
assume ρx = ρy as in (c); since ξ is a total order, we can also assume with-
out loss of generality that x ≻ξ y ; according to (60), this ensures that all the
terms of the right-hand side of (59) are positive or zero; since the left-hand
side vanishes, we arrive at the conclusion that every term of the right-hand
side must vanish; so, we get vxy = vyx as well as vxz = vyz for any z 6∈ {x, y} .
In order to complete the proof of (c) it remains to prove that we have also
vzx = vzy for any z 6∈ {x, y} . This will be a consequence of the fact that we
will prove next.
In fact, we claim that
vxy = vyx ⇒ vxz = vyz, vzx = vzy, for any z 6∈ {x, y}. (61)
In order to prove this implication we will distinguish three cases: Case (i) :
x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z . In this case it suffices to notice that
vxz = max(vxy, vyz) = max(vyx, vyz) = vyz,
vyz = min(vyx, vxz) = min(vxy, vxz) = vxz
where we are using successively from left to right: (46) and (47), the assumed
equality vxy = vyx , and (60) with y replaced by z . Case (ii) : z ≻ξ x ≻ξ y .
This case is analogous to the preceding one, with the difference that vxz = vyz
relies on (47) and vzx = vzy relies on (46). Case (iii) : x ≻ξ z ≻ξ y . In this
case, (60) allows to write the following inequalities:
vxy ≥ vxz ≥ vyz ≥ vyx,
vyx ≤ vzx ≤ vzy ≤ vxy.
When vxy = vyx all of them become equalities, which gives the desired result.
This completes the proof of (61).
The if part of statement (d) relies also on (61): If vxy = vyx , then we
have vxz = vyz for any z 6∈ {x, y} , which results in ρx = ρy because of (59).
The only-if part of (d) is contained in (c). Concerning statement (e), the
implication ρx > ρy ⇒ vxy > vyx follows easily from (b) together with (d),
whereas the implication ρx ≥ ρy ⇒ vxy ≥ vyx is contained in (b) together
with (c). Finally, in order to obtain (f) it suffices to combine (e) with Propo-
sition 3.3.
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3.3 In this paragraph we look at the compatibility between strengths and
mean preference scores.
In this connection, Zermelo proved that in the complete (and irreducible)
case the strengths always order the options in exactly the same way as the
mean preference scores [25 : § 4].
This compatibility easily disappears in the general incomplete case. How-
ever, it remains true for CLC matrices:
Theorem 3.5. For a CLC matrix, the associated mean preference scores
ρx and strengths ϕx have the following compatibility properties:
(a) ϕx > ϕy =⇒ ρx > ρy .
(b) ρx > ρy =⇒ either ϕx > ϕy or ϕx = ϕy = 0.
Proof. In the following X denotes again the top dominant component of
the Llull matrix, whose existence has been established by Proposition 3.3.
By Theorem 2.2, we know that ϕx > 0 if and only if x ∈ X . Let us begin
by noticing that both statements of the present theorem hold if ϕy = 0,
that is, if y 6∈ X . In this case statement (b) is trivial, while statement (a)
holds because of Lemma 3.4.(f). Consider now the case ϕx = 0. In this case
statement (a) is empty, whereas statement (b) reduces, via its contrapositive,
to Lemma 3.4.(f) (with x and y interchanged with each other).
So, from now on, we can assume that x and y are both in X , or, on
account of Theorem 2.2, that X = A. In the following we will make use of
the results of § 2, according to which the strengths (ϕx) are determined by
the condition of maximizing the function (21) under the restriction (23), and
that they satisfy the equations (22).
Part (a): It will be proved by seeing that a simultaneous occurrence of the
inequalities ϕx > ϕy and ρx ≤ ρy would entail a contradiction with the fact
that ϕ is the unique maximizer of F (ϕ). More specifically, we will see that
one would have F (ϕ˜) ≥ F (ϕ) where ϕ˜ is obtained from ϕ by interchanging
the values of ϕx and ϕy , that is
ϕ˜z =

ϕy, if z = x,
ϕx, if z = y,
ϕz, otherwise.
(62)
In fact, ϕ˜ differs from ϕ only in the components associated with x and y ,
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so that
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
=
(
ϕ˜x
ϕx
)vxy ∏
z 6=x,y
(
ϕ˜x/(ϕ˜x + ϕz)
ϕx/(ϕx + ϕz)
)vxz (ϕx + ϕz
ϕ˜x + ϕz
)vzx
×
(
ϕ˜y
ϕy
)vyx ∏
z 6=x,y
(
ϕ˜y/(ϕ˜y + ϕz)
ϕy/(ϕy + ϕz)
)vyz (ϕy + ϕz
ϕ˜y + ϕz
)vzy
.
(63)
More particularly, in the case of (62) this expression becomes
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
=
(
ϕy
ϕx
)vxy−vyx ∏
z 6=x,y
(
ϕy/(ϕy + ϕz)
ϕx/(ϕx + ϕz)
)vxz−vyz (ϕy + ϕz
ϕx + ϕz
)vzy−vzx
, (64)
where all of the bases are strictly less than 1, since ϕx > ϕy , and all of the
the exponents are non-positive, because of Lemma 3.4.(b, c). Therefore, the
product is greater than or equal to 1, as claimed.
Part (b): Since we are assuming x, y ∈ X , it is a matter of proving that
ρx > ρy ⇒ ϕx > ϕy . On the other hand, by making use of the contrapositive
of (a), the problem reduces to proving that ϕx = ϕy ⇒ ρx = ρy .
Similarly to above, this implication will be proved by seeing that a si-
multaneous occurrence of the equality ϕx = ϕy =: ω together with the
inequality ρx > ρy (by symmetry it suffices to consider this one) would en-
tail a contradiction with the fact that ϕ is the unique maximizer of F (ϕ).
More specifically, here we will see that one would have F (ϕ˜) > F (ϕ) where
ϕ˜ is obtained from ϕ by slightly increasing ϕx while decreasing ϕy , that is
ϕ˜z =

ω + ǫ, if z = x,
ω − ǫ, if z = y,
ϕz, otherwise.
(65)
This claim will be proved by checking that
d
dǫ
log
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
> 0. (66)
In fact, (63) entails that
log
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
= C + vxy log ϕ˜x + vyx log ϕ˜y
+
∑
z 6=x,y
(
vxz log
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕz
+ vyz log
ϕ˜y
ϕ˜y + ϕz
)
−
∑
z 6=x,y
(
vzy log(ϕ˜y + ϕz) + vzx log(ϕ˜x + ϕz)
)
,
(67)
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where C does not depend on ǫ. Therefore, in view of (65) we get
d
dǫ
log
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
= (vxy − vyx) 1
ω
+
∑
z 6=x,y
(vxz − vyz) ϕz
ω(ω + ϕz)
+
∑
z 6=x,y
(vzy − vzx) 1
ω + ϕz
.
(68)
Now, according to parts (b) and (e) of Lemma 3.4, the assumption that
ρx > ρy implies the inequalities vxy > vyx , vxz ≥ vyz and vzy ≥ vzx , which
result indeed in (66).
3.4 It is interesting to notice that a CLC matrix keeps an important part
of this structure when passing to the relative scores qxy = vxy/txy :
Proposition 3.6. Assume that (vxy) is a CLC matrix. If one has txy > 0
for all x, y , then the relative scores qxy = vxy/txy have the following proper-
ties, where ξ is any admissible order for (vxy):
qxy ≥ qyx, whenever x ≻ξ y, (69)
qxz ≥ qyz , qzx ≤ qzy, whenever x ≻ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}. (70)
Besides, the top dominant irreducible component X of (vxy) is also top dom-
inant irreducible for (qxy), with the special property that
qxy > 0, whenever x ∈ X and y 6= x. (71)
If one has txy = 0 for some x, y , then there exists Y ⊆ A such that
txx¯ > 0, whenever x, x¯ 6∈ Y , (72)
vyx = 0, whenever y ∈ Y and x 6= y. (73)
Proof. Consider first the case where txy > 0 for all x, y . Clearly, (45)
immediately implies (69). On the other hand, (50) implies (70) because of
the following chains of implications:
vxz
txz
≥ vyz
tyz
⇐⇒ txz
vxz
≤ tyz
vyz
⇐⇒ 1 + vzx
vxz
≤ 1 + vzy
vyz
, (74)
vzx
tzx
≤ vzy
tzy
⇐⇒ tzx
vzx
≥ tzy
vzy
⇐⇒ 1 + vxz
vzx
≥ 1 + vyz
vzy
. (75)
The statement about the top dominant irreducible component is also an
immediate consequence of the positivity of the turnouts.
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If txy=0 for some x, y , then (51) allows to derive that tpp′ = 0 for some p.
If p1 is the first element with this property and we set Y = {y ∈ A | p1 ≻−
ξ y} ,
we immediately obtain (72), and (50) together with (46) are easily seen to
lead to (73).
As a consequence, we can see that the mean relative preference scores
σx =
1
N − 1
∑
y 6=x
vxy/txy (76)
rank the items in the same way as the original mean preference scores:
Corollary 3.7. Assume that (vxy) is a CLC matrix with positive turnouts.
In that case, one has σx > σy if and only if ρx > ρy .
Proof. In order to prove the stated equivalence, it suffices to prove the two
following implications:
ρx ≥ ρy =⇒ σx ≥ σy, (77)
ρx > ρy =⇒ σx > σy. (78)
The implication (77) is easily obtained by combining parts (b, c) of Lemma 3.4
with the chain of implications (74). In order to prove (78) it suffices to notice
that, according to part (e) of Lemma 3.4, ρx > ρy implies vxy > vyx and
therefore vxy/txy > vyx/tyx .
Remark. If txy = 0 for some x, y , the last statement of Proposition 3.6
justifies considering any y ∈ Y categorically worse than any x 6∈ Y , and
restricting the rating to the subset X = A \ Y , which brings the problem to
the case of positive turnouts.
4 The CLC projection followed by Zermelo’s method of strengths
In this section we consider the rating method that is obtained by com-
posing the CLC projection of [1, 2 ] and Zermelo’s method of strengths.
That is, we consider the mapping Φ = ZP , where P denotes the CLC pro-
jection mapping (vxy) 7→ (vπxy) and Z denotes the mapping defined by the
method of strengths. As we will see, the properties of Z obtained in the
present article (Section 2) combine with those of P (Section 3) to ensure
that the resulting rating method enjoys the properties that we claimed in
the introduction.
28 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
We will use the following notations: (vxy) denotes the original Llull ma-
trix, (vπxy) denotes the projected one, and (ϕx) denotes the final strengths.
We will refer to the latter as the CLC-Zermelo fractions.
The next result establishes the property of single-choice voting consis-
tency.
Theorem 4.1. When each ballot confines to choosing a single option, the
CLC-Zermelo fractions coincide with the respective vote fractions.
Proof. As it was mentioned in § 1.1, in the case of single-choice voting one
has vxy = fx , and therefore txy = fx+fy , for every y 6= x. Such matrices have
CLC structure, so they are invariant by the CLC projection: vπxy = vxy = fx .
By plugging these values in (22–23), one easily sees that these equations are
satisfied by taking ϕx = fx .
Let us consider now the property of unanimous decomposition. This
property is concerned with unanimously preferred sets, i. e. subsets X
of options with the property that each member of X is unanimously preferred
to any alternative from outside X .
Theorem 4.2. (a) The CLC-Zermelo fractions vanish outside of any unan-
imously preferred set. (b) In the complete case, the options that get non-
vanishing CLC-Zermelo fractions form a minimal unanimously preferred set.
Proof. The proof hinges on comparing the set under consideration with
the top dominant irreducible component of the projected Llull matrix (vπxy),
whose existence is guaranteed by Proposition 3.3. In the following, this top
dominant irreducible component is denoted by X̂ .
Part (a). Let X be an unanimously preferred set. By [2 :Lem. 7.1], the
hypothesis that vxy = 1 for all x ∈ X and y 6∈ X implies vπxy = 1, and
therefore vπyx = 0, for all such pairs. This entails that X̂ ⊆ X , which leads
to the claimed conclusion since Theorem 2.2 ensures that ϕy = 0 for any
y 6∈ X̂ .
Part (b). Let X be the set of options with non-vanishing CLC-Zermelo
fractions. We claim that X = X̂ . In fact, otherwise Theorem 2.2 would
imply the existence of some x ∈ X with ϕx = 0 or some y ∈ Y = A \ X
with ϕy > 0.
In particular, we have vπyx = 0 for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Because of the
completeness assumption, this implies that vπxy = 1 and —by [2 :Lem. 7.1]—
vxy = 1 for all those pairs. So X is an unanimously preferred set.
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Finally, let us see that X is minimal for this property: If we had X ′ ⊂ X
satisfying vxˆyˆ = 1 for all xˆ ∈ X ′ and yˆ ∈ Y ′ = A \ X ′ , then [1 :Lem. 9.1]
would give vπxˆyˆ = 1 and therefore v
π
yˆxˆ = 0 for all such pairs, so X could not
be the top dominant irreducible component of the matrix (vπxy).
Still in connection with the property of unanimous decomposition, the
following proposition includes a special case of incompleteness that has prac-
tical interest.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that the individual votes are complete, or al-
ternatively, that each of them is a ranking (possibly truncated or with ties).
If X is a minimal unanimously preferred set, then the CLC-Zermelo frac-
tions of X are all of them positive and they coincide with those that one
obtains when the individual votes are restricted to X .
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that the CLC structure of the projected
Llull matrix ensures that tπxy = 1 for all x, y ∈ X . In fact, the inequalities
(51) allow to derive it from the known fact —obtained in the proof of part (a)
of the preceding theorem— that tπxy = 1 for all x ∈ X and y 6∈ X .
Now we claim that under the present hypotheses, i. e. either completeness
or ranking character of the individual votes, one has X̂ = X . In fact, a strict
inclusion X̂ ⊂ X would mean that vπxxˆ = 0 for any x ∈ X\X̂ and xˆ ∈ X̂ . By
the remark of the preceding paragraph, this implies that vπxˆx = 1 for all such
pairs. Since we also have vπxy = 1 for x ∈ X and y 6∈ X , we can conclude
that vπxˆyˆ = 1 for all xˆ ∈ X̂ and yˆ 6∈ X̂ . Now, according to [1 :Lem. 9.1]
(for the complete case) and [2 :Lem. 7.1] (for the case of rankings, which
are certainly transitive), this implies that vxˆyˆ = 1 for all such pairs. This
contradicts the supposed minimality of X .
So, X itself is the top dominant irreducible component of the matrix
(vπxy). By making use of Theorem 2.2, it follows that ϕx > 0 for all x ∈ X
and that they are the strengths determined by the restriction of the projected
Llull matrix (vπxy) to the set X . In order to complete the proof, we must
show that this restriction of the projected Llull matrix coincides with the
projection of the same restriction applied to the original Llull matrix (vxy),
i. e. vπxx¯ = v˜
π
xx¯ for any x, x¯ ∈ X , where we are using a tilde to denote the
objects associated with the matrix obtained by first restricting and then
projecting. In order to establish this equality, it suffices to obtain analogous
equalities for the corresponding margins and turnouts. Besides, by taking
into account the way that the CLC projection is defined, it suffices to obtain
these equalities for x¯ = x′ , namely the option that immediately follows x
in an admissible order ξ (X is easily seen to be a segment of ξ ). For the
margins, this equality is obtained in [1 :Lem. 9.2], whose proof is valid without
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any need for completeness. For the turnouts, this equality is immediately
true in the complete case. In the case of ranking votes, it suffices to observe
that the X restriction of the original Llull matrix is complete. This is true
because of the following implications: (i) vxy = 1 for some y ∈ A implies
that x is explicitly mentioned in all of the ranking votes; and (ii) x being
explicitly mentioned in all of the ranking votes implies that txy = 1 for any
y ∈ A.
Theorem 4.4. The CLC-Zermelo fractions depend continuously on the
original Llull matrix.
Proof. This is a consequence of the continuity of the mappings P and Z .
The former is guaranteed by [2 :Thm. 6.1] and the latter by Theorems 2.2
and 2.1.
Theorem 4.5. The CLC-Zermelo fractions comply with the Condorcet-
Smith principle: If A is partitioned in two sets X and Y with the property
that vxy > 1/2 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , then for any such x and y one
has either ϕx > ϕy or ϕx = ϕy = 0.
Proof. Let us assume that the original Llull matrix is in the situation consid-
ered by the Condorcet-Smith principle. According to [2 :Thm. 8.1], the mean
ranks Rx of the projected Llull matrix (v
π
xy) satisfy the inequality Rx < Ry
for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . In terms of the mean preference scores ρx , which
are related to the mean ranks r¯x = Rx by the linear decreasing transforma-
tion (12), we get therefore ρx > ρy for any such x and y . So, it suffices to
combine that result with Theorem 3.5 of the preceding section.
Let us assume that all the individual preferences are reversed, or equiva-
lently, that the Llull matrix is replaced by its transpose. As a result of such
a transformation, one would expect the final ranking to be reversed. This
condition is known in the literature by the name of inversion [4, 9 ].
Zermelo’s method by itself is easily seen to satisfy this condition, at least
in the irreducible case. More precisely, in this case the strengths for the
transposed matrix are proportional to 1/ϕx, where ϕx are the strengths for
the original matrix. In the reducible case, the positive strengths move from
the top-dominant component to the bottom-dominated one (whenever the
latter exists).
The following results establish the inversion property for the mean prefer-
ence scores of the CLC-projected Llull matrix as well as for the CLC-Zermelo
fractions (except for the ties between options with vanishing fractions).
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Theorem 4.6. Assume that all of the binary preferences are reversed,
i. e. the scores (vxy) are replaced by (v˜xy), where v˜xy = vyx . Let ρx and
ρ˜x be the mean preference scores of the respective CLC-projected Llull matri-
ces. They behave in the following way: ρx > ρy =⇒ ρ˜x < ρ˜y .
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that the respective indirect scores satisfy
v˜∗xy = v
∗
yx, (79)
which is clear from (13).
Consider now the respective CLC-projected Llull matrices (vπxy) and (v˜
π
xy).
In [1 : § 2.4] and [2 : § 2.1, Step 2] it is seen that the admissible orders for (vπxy)
are characterized as follows: xy ∈ ξ if and only if v∗xy ≥ v∗yx . Let us fix such
an order ξ and let ξ˜ be its reverse. Using (79), the preceding double impli-
cation can be rewritten as yx ∈ ξ˜ if and only if v˜∗yx ≥ v˜∗xy, which ensures ξ˜
to be an admissible order for (v˜πxy).
We will now apply Lemma 3.4 to the CLC matrices (vπxy) and (v˜
π
xy). Using
part (a) of that lemma —as well as its contrapositive— we get the following
implication: ρx > ρy ⇒ xy ∈ ξ ⇒ yx ∈ ξ˜ ⇒ ρ˜y ≥ ρ˜x .
In order to complete the proof, it suffices to show that ρ˜y = ρ˜x ⇔ ρx = ρy .
To this effect, we can restrict ourselves to the case where y immediately
follows x in the order ξ . In fact, having ρy = ρx and x ≻ξ z ≻ξ y clearly
implies ρy = ρz = ρx . So we can assume y = x
′ . By part (d) of Lemma 3.4,
our aim amounts at showing that v˜πxx′ = v˜
π
x′x ⇔ vπxx′ = vπx′x . Now, equations
(20), (11) and (7) of [2 ] ensure that vπxx′ − vπx′x = min { v∗pq − v∗qp | p ≻−
ξ
x, x′ ≻−
ξ q }. Using (79) as well as the fact that ξ˜ is the reverse of ξ, the
right-hand side transforms into the analogous expression that corresponds to
v˜πx′x − v˜πxx′ . So we get v˜πx′x − v˜πxx′ = vπxx′ − vπx′x, which entails the claimed
double implication.
Remark. In the complete case these arguments together with the formulas
for vπxy given in [1 ] show that the CLC projection commutes then with trans-
position. This commutability is not true in the general incomplete case.
Corollary 4.7. In the conditions of the preceding theorem the CLC-Zermelo
fractions behave in the following way: ϕx > ϕy =⇒ either ϕ˜x < ϕ˜y or ϕ˜x =
ϕ˜y = 0.
Proof. Again, it suffices to combine the preceding result with Theorem 3.5
of the preceding section.
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The next theorem is concerned with clone consistency. In this connection
we make use of the notion of autonomous sets. A subset C ⊆ A is said to
be autonomous for a binary relation η when each element from outside C
relates to all elements of C in the same way; more precisely, when, for
any x 6∈ C , having ax ∈ η for some a ∈ C implies bx ∈ η for any b ∈ C , and
similarly, having xa ∈ η for some a ∈ C implies xb ∈ η for any b ∈ C . More
generally, a subset C ⊆ A will be said to be autonomous for a valued relation
(vxy) when the equalities vax = vbx and vxa = vxb hold whenever a, b ∈ C
and x 6∈ C . For more details about the notion of autonomous set and the
property of clone consistency we refer the reader to [1 : § 11]. Autonomous
sets are also considered in [3 ], where they are called macrovertices.
Theorem 4.8. The CLC-Zermelo fractions have the following property of
clone consistency: Assume that C ⊂ A is an autonomous set for each of
the individual votes. Assume also that either C ⊆ X or C ⊇ A \X , where
X = { x ∈ A | ϕx > 0}. Under these hypotheses one has the following
facts: (a) C is autonomous for the ranking determined by the CLC-Zermelo
fractions; and (b) contracting C to a single option in all of the individual
votes has no other effect in that ranking than getting the same contraction.
Proof. Once more, it suffices again to combine [2 :Thm. 8.2] with Theo-
rem 3.5 of the preceding section.
Finally, the following result considers the effect of raising a particular
option a to a more preferred status in the individual ballots without any
change in the preferences about the other options.
Theorem 4.9. Assume that the scores vxy are modified into new values v˜xy
such that
v˜ay ≥ vay, v˜xa ≤ vxa, v˜xy = vxy, ∀x, y 6= a. (80)
In these circumstances the CLC-Zermelo fractions behave in the following
way: ϕa > ϕy =⇒ ϕ˜a ≥ ϕ˜y .
Proof. According to [2 :Thm. 8.4], the mean ranks Rx of the projected Llull
matrix (vπxy) behave in the following way: Ra < Ry =⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y . In terms
of the mean preference scores ρx , which are related to the mean ranks r¯x =
Rx by the linear decreasing transformation (12), we have therefore ρa >
ρy =⇒ ρ˜a ≥ ρ˜y . So, it suffices to combine this with Theorem 3.5 of the
present article.
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5 Concluding remarks
5.1 In this subsection we look at the possibility of achieving the same prop-
erties by means of other methods.
A classical idea to be considered in this connection is rating the options
by means of a non-negative right eigenvector of the paired-comparison ma-
trix. This approach arises naturally as a refinement of the mean preference
scores. In fact, the mean preference score of x combines the preference scores
vxy (y 6= x) with equal weights. However, one can argue that a given pref-
erence score over a highly rated option y should convey more value to x
than the same preference score over a lowly rated option y . This leads to
looking for a system of ratings (τx) that satisfy a relationship of the form∑
y 6=x vxy τy = λ τx for some λ > 0. In conformity with the idea of mixing
proportions, one requires also τx ≥ 0 and
∑
x τx = 1. In other words, (τx)
should be a non-negative right eigenvector of the matrix that is obtained
from (vxy) by filling the diagonal with zeroes, and the corresponding eigen-
value should be positive. One can look for such an eigenvector by solving the
preceding equations in a direct way. Alternatively, one can often approach it
by an iterative procedure of the form τ
(n+1)
x =
∑
y 6=x vxy τ
(n)
y starting from a
positive vector τ (0) . Usually one takes τ
(0)
x = 1/N for all x (recall that N is
the number of options) in which case the τ
(1)
x are proportional to the mean
preference scores.
This idea was put forward in 1895 by Edmund Landau in his first pub-
lished mathematical paper [13 ]. Landau was motivated by chess tourna-
ments, where some rating methods had been introduced that amounted to
using the rating τ (2) . He returned to the subject in 1914 [14 ], after Oskar
Perron and Georg Frobenius had proven their celebrated theorem that guar-
antees the existence and uniqueness of such a non-negative eigenvector in the
case of an irreducible non-negative matrix. Forty years later, the same idea
was proposed by T.H. Wei and Maurice G. Kendall [24, 12 ].2
In his second paper on the subject, Landau considered the condition of
unanimous decomposition, more specifically its part (a) as stated in page 3,
as a natural constraint for selecting among the several non-negative eigenvec-
tors that can exist in the event of an unanimous decomposition [14 : p. 201].
However, one can see that this constraint conflicts with the condition of con-
tinuity that we would like also to be satisfied. Let us take, for instance, the
2We have not been able to check reference [24 ].
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following matrix:
Vǫ =
a 1−ǫ 1−ǫ
ǫ b 1/2
ǫ 1/2 c
(81)
For ǫ > 0 (and less than 1) its unique non-negative eigenvector (unique up to
multiplication by a positive number) is
(
8(1−ǫ)(1+√1+32ǫ−32ǫ2 )−1, 1, 1)T,
whose limit as ǫ ↓ 0 is (4, 1, 1)T . However, this is not a multiple of (1, 0, 0)T,
the rating that the condition of unanimous decomposition requires for ǫ = 0.
(Notice that both (4, 1, 1)T and (1, 0, 0)T are non-negative eigenvectors of
V0 and that their corresponding eigenvalues are respectively 1/2 and 0.)
This and other problems seem to disappear for a method that can be
viewed as a derivation of the preceding one, namely the so-called fair bets
method, proposed more or less independently by Henry E. Daniels in 1969 [7 ]
and by John W. Moon and Norman J. Pullman in 1970 [18 ].
The fair bets, that we will denote by ψx , have the following meaning: Let
us interpret the paired-comparison scores vxy as numbers of victories of x
over y . We will assume that every time that a player x beats another one y ,
the latter pays to the former the amount ψy . The fair bets are the values
that result in no player winning nor losing any money. In other words, for
every x one should have the equality
∑
y 6=x vxyψy =
∑
y 6=x vyxψx . As before,
together with these equations one requires also ψx ≥ 0 and
∑
x ψx = 1.
The fair bets are easily seen to have good behaviour in connection with the
conditions of single-choice voting consistency and unanimous decomposition.
A preliminary exploration suggests that they also depend continuously on
the preference scores even in the neighbourhood of a reducible matrix. For
instance, in the case of (81) they are proportional to (1− ǫ, ǫ, ǫ)T.
On the other hand, they do not satisfy the Condorcet principle (in com-
mon with the mean preference scores and Zermelo’s strengths). For instance,
in the case of (1–2) one gets the following values: a: 0.323, b: 0.378, c: 0.174
d: 0.124, where b gets the largest fraction in spite of the fact that a has a
majority of first placings.
However, the experience of this article on Zermelo’s method suggests that
combining the CLC projection with the fair-bets method could also give a
method with the desired properties, including the Condorcet-Smith principle.
By the way, in the case of (1–2), this combined procedure gives the following
results: a: 0.325, b: 0.286, c: 0.214 d: 0.175. So we pose the two following
questions:
Open question 1. Are the fair bets continuous functions of the preference
scores even in the neighbourhood of a reducible matrix?
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Open question 2. Is the Condorcet-Smith principle satisfied when the fair
bets are preceded by the CLC projection?
In contrast to Zermelo’s method, the fair bets are known to violate the
condition of inversion [9 :Example 4.4]. However, numerical experiments sug-
gest that the following question may still have a positive answer:
Open question 3. Do the fair bets have the property of inversion when
they are preceded by the CLC projection?
5.2 In Theorem 4.9 we considered the effect of raising a particular option
a to a more preferred status in the individual ballots without any change
in the preferences about the other options. Besides the property that was
obtained in that theorem, in this situation it would be quite desirable to
have an increase in the fraction associated with a : ϕ˜a ≥ ϕa. This condition
of quantitative monotonicity was considered by Landau in [14 ], where it
is shown that this condition is violated by the right non-negative eigenvector
even in the irreducible case.
Zermelo’s method is ensured to have this property [25 : p. 444]. However,
this is not true for Zermelo’s method preceded by the CLC projection, since
the latter does not have good properties in this connection (which motivated
the open question 1 of [1 ]).
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